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ABSTRACT 
 Individuals differ in their ability to acquire associations between stimuli and 
paired outcomes, an ability that has been proposed to be independent of general 
metrics of intelligence or memory (e.g., Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & 
Mackintosh, 2009). The nature of these differences may reflect the type of 
associative structures acquired during learning, for instance configuring stimuli to 
facilitate flexible learning and memory. We test the hypothesis that individuals differ 
in configural associative learning as distinct from simpler (elemental) stimulus-
outcome learning. In Experiment 1 participants were screened for attentional scope 
and we found that attentional scope predicted configural associative learning that 
could not be explained simply in terms of differences in strength of associative 
learning. In Experiment 2, attentional scope was trained resulting in a shift in 
participants’ ability to learn about subsequent configurations unrelated to the training 
material. We discuss how the differences between individual learners reflect 
differences in configuring rather than simply differences in strength or speed of 
learning.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Associative learning is the ability to acquire a link between two or more 
stimuli, such that the presentation of one stimulus can activate or inhibit the 
expectation of another. Associative learning is thought to underlie a range of memory 
and learning capacities, including Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Bouton, 
1994; Colwill & Rescorla, 1986; Wasserman & Miller, 1997), as well as more general 
aspects of human performance such as, instrumental or agentic control (Byrom, 
Msetfi, & Murphy, 2015; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005), spatial 
navigation (Buckley, Smith, & Haselgrove, 2015; Pearce, 2009), motivational 
systems (e.g., appetite; Brunstrom, 2007), as well as response systems related to 
pathology, such as fear responses to threat (Arnaudova et al., 2013; Duits et al., 
2015; Lissek et al., 2009), chemotherapy-induced anticipatory nausea (Hall, 
Stockhorst, Enck, & Klosterhalfen, 2015; Rodríguez, 2013), and the development 
and maintenance of substance addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2016; Hogarth, Balleine, 
Corbit, & Killcross, 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2012; Torres et al., 2013). Across all of 
these phenomena, experimental work suggests that individuals differ in their 
associative learning (e.g., Murphy & Msetfi, 2014). It is less clear whether these 
differences represent sources of natural variability in learning or fundamental 
differences in how people learn, such as differences in how associations develop 
and what form the associations might take.  
The role that configuring plays in learning is one area in which significant 
research has been conducted and differences, thought to relate to underlying neural 
structures, have been identified (e.g., Fanselow, 1999; Honey, Iordanova, & Good, 
2014; Iordanova, Burnett, Aggleton, Good, & Honey, 2009; McDonald et al., 1997). 
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Evidence from this research with humans and other animals suggests that 
configuring plays a role particularly where individual cues do not resolve the 
discrimination. The negative patterning (Whitlow & Wagner, 1972) and biconditional 
discrimination (Saavedra, 1975) are examples of such problems. In negative 
patterning stimuli presented alone are paired with one type of outcome (A+, B+) but 
the combination of stimuli is paired with the absence of outcome or a different 
outcome (AB-). Since simply summing what has been learnt about the individual 
stimuli does not provide the correct outcome prediction for compound trials, 
researchers have sought to understand how associations can be modified to account 
for accurate performance. Animals (Kehoe & Graham, 1988; McDonald et al., 1997; 
Whitlow & Wagner, 1972) and humans (Byrom & Murphy, 2014; Harris & Livesey, 
2008; Harris, Livesey, Gharaei, & Westbrook, 2008) can readily solve the negative 
patterning discrimination, biconditional discrimination (i.e., AX+, AY-, BX-, BY+) and 
other similar problems.  
One explanation proposes that, at a peripheral level, the integration of the 
perceptual input that accompanies stimulus exposure, provides a unique stimulus to 
support discrimination learning (for review see, Melchers, Shanks, & Lachnit, 2008). 
For instance, if the two stimuli in a negative patterning discrimination are auditory 
cues then the compound of the two stimuli may be a perceptually unique new third 
stimulus (e.g., C) which can become associated with the absence of outcome (ABC-; 
e.g., Deisig, Lachnit, Sandoz et al., 2003). From this perspective then, configural 
discrimination does not require a configural processing system. One prediction of 
this hypothesis is that the extent to which individuals configure will depend critically 
on the physical characteristics of the stimuli used in the discrimination. 
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Research has been conducted to test this modality hypothesis, comparing the 
tendency to configure when stimuli are either from the same or different modalities 
(e.g., Kehoe, Horne, Horne, & Macrae, 1994; Redhead, 2007). This work generally 
shows that configuring is facilitated by stimuli from the same modality (Melchers et 
al., 2008; see also, Soto, Gershman & Niv, 2014). Ultimately though, even with this 
hypothesis, the ability to configure might be still be expected to vary between 
individuals by the extent to which an individual peripherally integrated the stimulus 
input. 
Another hypothesis suggests that, somewhat independent of the nature of the 
stimuli, people vary in how easily or likely they are to configure stimuli; in this sense, 
configuring is like a mental skill. There is evidence from clinical literature to suggest 
that individuals differ in their ability to represent or recall configurations of cues. For 
example, individuals with depression are more likely to recall simple associations 
rather than complex configural representations when probed for autobiographical 
memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995, 2011; Williams & Scott, 
1988). Similarly, anxiety disorders have been linked to an inability to use configural 
cues, such as contexts, to modulate the associative expectation of threat (Acheson, 
Gresack, & Risbrough, 2012; van Ast, Vervliet, & Kindt, 2012).  
This prompts the question of whether individuals differ in the rate of 
associative learning per se, or differ specifically in their ability to represent and learn 
about configurations. Individual difference in the ability to learn about configurations 
may simply relate to a general difference in the efficiency of associative learning 
(Kaufman et al., 2009). Indeed, impaired contextual fear conditioning in individuals 
with high levels of anxiety has been suggested to arise because of a general deficit 
in associative learning (e.g., Grillon, 2002; Lissek et al., 2009). However, we 
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hypothesise that individuals differ in their ability to represent and use cue 
configurations when learning, over and above a difference in simple associative 
learning. Tests of performance on the negative patterning discrimination have 
provided support for this hypothesis; individual difference in ability to solve a 
negative patterning discrimination, requiring use of configurations (A+, BC+, ABC-), 
can be dissociated from a difference in ability to solve a simple discrimination on the 
basis of isolated stimuli (D+, EF+, GHI-; Byrom & Murphy, 2014). Thus, testing 
individual differences in negative patterning suggested that differences in ability to 
configure stimuli, could be dissociated from general efficiency of associative 
learning.  
The biconditional discrimination, like negative patterning, is one of a class of 
configural discriminations considered relatively difficult both in terms of solution and 
interpretation (e.g., McDonald et al., 1997). Research has proposed that some of the 
difficulty in configural discriminations may reflect individual differences in attention or 
memory, and further that these differences may reflect fundamental differences in 
the processing mechanism (Sutherland & Rudy, 1989, Fanselow, 1999) or 
involvement of specialised neural systems (Honey, Iordanova & Good, 2014, 
McDonald et al., 1997). For instance, the latter work claims that the mammalian 
hippocampus plays a central role in solving configural tasks. Another perspective is 
that these discriminations are diagnostic of the learning and memory processing 
differences associated with psychopathology. For instance Haddon, et al., (2011) 
have suggested that failure to learn a biconditional discrimination may reflect the 
attentional differences demonstrated by people with Schizophrenia. 
The current study aims to support the evidence of a difference in configural 
processing as distinct from a hypothesis that treats configural discriminations as 
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simply more difficult than other elemental discrimination and further that this this 
difference is flexible and modifiable. Here we employ two experiments, to test this 
hypothesis, using a set of conditional discriminations that require individuals either 
(a) to learn about one of three co-occurring cues, while ignoring irrelevant cues 
(uniconditional discrimination) or (b) to learn about configurations of two or three 
cues (biconditional and triconditional discriminations; see also Shepard, Hovland & 
Jenkins, 1961). As shown in Table 1, in the uniconditional discrimination one of the 
three stimuli signals the paired outcome, and therefore the discrimination can be 
solved using associations between single stimuli and their paired outcomes. The 
uniconditional discrimination thus provides an index of simple associative learning. 
Solving the biconditional and triconditional discriminations requires the co-
occurrence of stimuli to be represented so that participants learn about a 
configuration; simply learning individual associations between each of the co-
occurring stimuli and the paired outcome is insufficient. In the biconditional 
discrimination no single stimulus predicts the outcome, as each stimulus is paired 
with both outcomes equally. Instead, in the biconditional discrimination, participants 
need to learn that combinations of two co-occurring stimuli predict the outcome. The 
triconditional discrimination requires participants to learn that configurations of three 
co-occurring stimuli predict the outcome. In general, the uniconditional discrimination 
is easiest to acquire, followed by the biconditional discrimination and the 
triconditional discrimination is the hardest to acquire (Love, 2002; Nosofsky, 1984; 
Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961; Smith, Minda, & Washburn, 2004).  
As the difficulty of these discriminations differs we expect to find a general 
pattern that acquisition of uniconditional is stronger than the biconditional which is 
stronger than the triconditional. However, if individuals differ in their ability to use 
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configurations, we should see individual differences in the ability to acquire the 
different discriminations. More efficient associative learning in general would predict 
better acquisition of all three discriminations. However, enhanced configural learning 
will improve acquisition of the biconditional and triconditional discrimination, but 
potentially interfere with learning in the uniconditional discrimination. Acquisition of 
the uniconditional discrimination should be facilitated by learning about individual 
stimuli and not using configurations.  
We are interested in whether, either on the basis of a measure of attentional 
scope or on the basis of training, individuals differ in their ability to learn these 
discriminations. Attentional scope refers to a distinction between focusing on fine 
grained, local or goal relevant details contrasted with a more global focus that 
captures peripheral and goal irrelevant details (Navon 1977; Lavie 2005). Attentional 
scope has been implicated in associative learning in general (Acheson et al., 2012; 
Bar, 2009; Haselgrove & Evans, 2010) and configural learning in particular (Byrom & 
Murphy, 2014). Further, attentional scope may be particularly relevant for these 
discriminations, as they vary in the level of relevant and irrelevant information, with 
no irrelevant stimuli in the triconditional discrimination, one irrelevant stimulus in the 
biconditional and two irrelevant stimuli in the uniconditional discrimination. Shepard 
et al., (1961) suggested that successful acquisition of these discriminations might 
relate to selective allocation of attention to relevant stimuli (see also, Kruschke, 
1992; Mackintosh, 1975). Narrow attentional scope may be expected to enhance 
ability to focus on the relevant stimuli and ignore irrelevant stimuli. As such narrow 
attentional scope should enhance acquisition of uniconditional discrimination, but 
might be expected to interfere with learning the biconditional and triconditional 
discriminations.  
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In two experiments we test three hypotheses; (1) that individuals differ in the 
efficiency of configural associative learning, beyond a simple difference in 
associative learning, (2) attentional scope predicts this difference and, (3) ability to 
engage in configural as opposed to simple associative learning and vice versa can 
be trained.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
 This experiment tests the first two hypotheses, using a within subjects 
comparison of uniconditional, biconditional and triconditional discrimination tasks, as 
shown in Table 1. Attentional scope was assessed using the Navon task (Byrom & 
Murphy, 2014; Navon, 1977).  
METHOD 
Participants 
Sample size was calculated using effect size estimates (f = .39) from prior 
work in our laboratory (Byrom & Murphy, 2014), to give a power of .98 to find a 
within-between subjects interaction. The 81 participants (female, n = 60) were 
university students with an average age of 21.80 years. Attentional scope did not 
correlate with working memory capacity (digit span), r (81) = .08, p = .47.  
Design  
A mixed factorial design was employed with discrimination task 
(uniconditional, biconditional and triconditional) and training period (early vs. late) as 
within subjects factors. The relation between attentional scope and discrimination 
was assessed.  
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Materials 
All experimental stimuli were programmed and presented using Visual Basic 
software.  
Discrimination tasks: Each task included three types of stimuli; a shape (an 
abstract black shape presented in the foreground), a colour (a background colour), 
and angled line grating in the background. Each task included eight different stimuli 
combinations. Three sets of stimuli (Set A, Set B and Set C) were created, with 
different shapes, colours and angles so that participants completed each task with a 
different stimulus set. The pairs of black shapes are shown in Figure 1. Colour pairs 
were yellow vs. red, pink vs. peach, and blue vs. green. The line grating angles were 
26° vs. 103°, 51° vs. 129°, and 77° vs. 154°. The use of stimulus set with 
discrimination task was counterbalanced (i.e., participant one completed 
uniconditional = Set A, biconditional = Set B and triconditional = Set C, participant 
two completed uniconditional = Set B, biconditional = Set C and triconditional = Set 
A, etc.).  
Navon Task: Four stimuli were used, consisting of large white letters 
composed of smaller white letters (e.g., a large H made up of smaller H’s) presented 
on a black background. Stimuli were presented in a square with the large letters 
spanning 55 mm x 44 mm (6.30° x 5.00°) and the small letters spanning 
approximately 5 mm x 5 mm (.60° x .60°; see Byrom and Murphy, 2014).  
Procedure 
After reading an information sheet and having the opportunity to ask 
questions, participants gave informed consent to participation. Participants 
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completed an automated programme that included the digit span assessment of 
working memory (Lezak, 1995), a measure of state anxiety, the Navon task and 
discrimination tasks. Whether participants completed the Navon task before or after 
discrimination tasks (task order) was partially counterbalanced, as shown in Table 2. 
Discrimination tasks: The cover story for the tasks involved stimuli being 
presented as works of art in a fictitious art gallery. The participants’ task was to 
predict the outcome (stimulus popularity). Participants were informed that the task 
was in three separate sections with completely independent sets of artwork. 
Participants completed all three discrimination tasks and discrimination order was 
partially counterbalanced, as shown in Table 2. The design of the discrimination 
tasks is shown in Table 1. Each task contained 8 stimuli combinations; four popular 
(positive outcome) and four unpopular (negative outcome).  
For each discrimination, stimuli combinations were displayed 12 times, giving 
a total of 96 trials. On each trial a stimulus combination was presented and 
participants were asked to predict the outcome, using a likert scale on the keyboard 
ranging from 1 (unpopular), through 5 (unsure) to 9 (highly popular). Following the 
prediction, feedback was presented showing the paired outcome (the stimulus’ 
popularity). This remained on the screen until the participant pressed a button for the 
next trial.  
Feedback was shown visually. Where a stimulus was popular (+) participants 
were shown a room more than 50% full of people. Where a stimulus was unpopular 
(-) participants were shown a room that was less than 50% full. Feedback was 
probabilistic, so that on popular trials the room was shown as 70%, 80% or 90% full, 
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and on unpopular trials the room was shown as 10%, 20% or 30% full. Probabilistic 
feedback was used to maintain the participant’s engagement with the task.  
Navon task: This task was used to measure attentional scope (Byrom & 
Murphy, 2014; Navon, 1977). Participants were informed that they would be 
presented with a series of large letters composed of small letters and on successive 
blocks they would be asked to identify the large or small letter presented. 
Participants completed 8 blocks of 16 trials, each containing 8 “S” stimuli and 8 “H” 
stimuli, half of these stimuli were incongruent such that large and small letters 
differed. Stimulus order was randomised within each block and the requirement to 
identify large or small letters alternated between blocks with half of the participants 
starting by identifying the large letters.  
On each trial, a fixation point was presented in the centre of the screen for 
5000 ms, followed by a stimulus presented for 400 ms. A mask replaced the stimulus 
and remained on the screen until the participant made a response using the S or H 
key on the keyboard. Following his / her response there was a 3000 ms inter-trial 
interval. The response time, measured from stimulus onset, and response accuracy 
were recorded. Attentional scope scores were calculated as the difference in 
response time on incongruent global (“identify the large letter”) and local (“identify 
the small letter”) trials.  
Data Analysis: Discrimination scores, were calculated as the prediction of 
outcome for stimuli paired with outcome (popular) less stimuli paired with no 
outcome (unpopular). Average discrimination scores were calculated for early (first 6 
trial blocks) and late (second 6 trial blocks) training periods. We used regression 
analysis with late period discrimination scores to assess the relationship between 
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attentional scope and discrimination. To provide further analysis of experimental 
effects, we have used a tertile split of attentional scope score to provide dichotomous 
variables of local attentional scope (range = -26.14 to -2.25; n = 27) and global 
attentional scope (range = 3.56 to 27.44; n = 27). Figure 2 shows average 
discrimination scores. Outcome predictions, across all 12 trial blocks, from which 
average discrimination scores were calculated, are shown in Figure 3.  
An alpha level of .05 was used throughout, with a Bonferroni correction to 
control for multiple comparisons. We report effect sizes effect sizes (𝜂𝑝
2) where key 
interactions are significant, and report effect sizes and confidence intervals where 
key simple main effects are significant. For regression analysis we report 
unstandardized coefficients (B), corresponding confidence intervals and 
standardised coefficients (β).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Discrimination between stimuli improved across training in all three tasks, but 
this performance was related to individual differences in attentional scope. As shown 
in Figure 2, individuals with a local attentional scope showed stronger discrimination 
than those with a global attentional scope in the uniconditional task, while individuals 
with a global attentional scope out-performed those with a local attentional scope in 
the triconditional task. These observations were verified through linear regression 
and repeated measures analysis of variance.  
Task and discrimination order did not influence attentional scope; univariate 
analysis of variance of attentional scope showed no effect of task order, F (1, 69) < 
1, p = .380 or discrimination order, F (1, 69) = 1.75, p = .135 and no significant 
interaction, F (5, 69) < 1, p = .652.  
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As attentional scope increased, the size of the difference in strength of 
discrimination between the uniconditional and triconditional tasks (uniconditional 
discrimination – triconditional discrimination) decreased. Attentional scope explained 
a significant proportion of variance in the difference in discrimination, R2 = .05, B = 
-.06 (.03), 95% CI (-.12, -.004), β = -.23, t (79) = 2.12, p = .037. The effect of 
attentional scope remained significant, B = -.06 (.03), 95% CI (-.12, -.004), β = -.24, t 
(77) = 2.11, p = .038, when including factors of task order and discrimination order, 
neither of which predicted discrimination difference (t (77) < 1, p = .79; t (77) < 1, p 
= .95, respectively).  
The difference between discriminations was driven by the strength of 
triconditional discrimination increasing with increasing attentional scope; R2 = .06, B 
=.04 (.02), 95% CI (.003, .09), β =.24, t (79) = 2.12, p = .035. Further, while simple 
associative learning, as indexed by discrimination in the uniconditional task, did not 
explain a significant proportion of the variance in triconditional discrimination, R2 
= .05, B = .21 (.03), 95% CI (-.005, .362), β = -.18, t (79) = 1.94, p = .056, attentional 
scope continued to explain a significant proportion of the variance in triconditional 
discrimination after accounting for simple associative learning R2 = .11, B = .05 (.02), 
95% CI (.007, .087), β = .25, t (78) = 2.35, p = .021. Attentional scope did not explain 
a significant proportion of variance in uniconditional, R2 < .01, B = -.02 (.03), 95% CI 
(-.07, .03), β = -.07, t (79) < 1, p = .52 or biconditional discrimination, R2 < .01, B 
< .01 (.03), 95% CI (-.06, .07), β =.01, t (79) < 1, p = .94.  
Analysis of variance was used to compare performance between tasks in 
further detail, with the within subjects factors of task (uniconditional, triconditional) 
and training period (early vs. late) and the between subjects factors of attentional 
scope group (local vs. global), discrimination order and task order suggested group 
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differences in the acquisition of the discriminations. Both attentional scope groups 
showed stronger discrimination in the uniconditional task than the triconditional task, 
F (1, 48) = 121.19, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .72, but this effect was greater for the local group 
than global group, F (1, 48) = 5.55, p = .023, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10. There was no evidence that 
this interaction differed significantly across periods of training, F (1, 52) = 1.72, p 
= .196. For the local group, the difference between the discrimination score in the 
two tasks was 𝑋 = 3.39 (.31), F (1, 26) = 121.57, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .82, 95% CI 
(.66, .88). The difference in discrimination scores between tasks was smaller for the 
global group, 𝑋 = 2.21 (.38), F (1, 26) = 33.91, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .57, 95% CI (.28, .71). 
While discrimination scores in the uniconditional task were higher for the local group 
than the global group, this effect was not significant, F (1, 52) = 2.87, p = .096. A 
non-significant trend in the opposite direction was observed with the triconditional 
task, with higher discrimination scores for the global group than the local group, F (1, 
52) = 3.16, p = .081. There was no main effect of discrimination order, F (1, 48) < 1, 
p = .43, and no higher level interactions, all F’s < 1.30, all p’s < .281.   
The intermediate group (n = 27), scoring between -2.25 and 3.56 on the 
Navon task, did not differ significantly in comparison of the uniconditional and 
triconditional discrimination over both stages of training from either the local group; F 
(1, 52) < 1, p =.785, or the global group; F(1, 52) < 1, p =.363.  
It is possible that this analysis of discrimination scores masks deficits in 
acquisition of specific stimulus-outcome associations, particularly in the triconditional 
discrimination. While discrimination scores increased significantly over training for 
the global group, this may reflect acquisition of only a subset of the 8 stimulus-
outcome associations. To test this, we analysed the number of stimulus-outcome 
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associations acquired. To meet the criteria for acquisition of a stimulus-outcome 
association, participants were required to give, on at least two consecutive trials, a 
stimulus paired with a positive outcome a rating of 6 or above or a stimulus paired 
with a negative outcome a rating of 4 or below. By the end of the 12 blocks of 
training, the global group had correctly acquired associations for 4.74 (SE = .39) 
stimuli in the triconditional discrimination and 26% of the global group had acquired 
outcome pairings for either 7 or 8 of the stimuli. In comparison, by the end of training, 
the local group had correctly acquired associations for 3.59 (SE = .34) stimuli in the 
triconditional discrimination and only 11% of the group had acquired outcome 
pairings for either 7 or 8 of the stimuli. Attentional scope score predicted the number 
of triconditional stimulus outcome pairings acquired, R2 = .05, B =.05 (.02), 95% CI 
(.003, .10), β =.23, t (79) = 2.10, p = .039. 
 Uniconditional discrimination was stronger than biconditional discrimination, 
which in turn was stronger than triconditional discrimination. Attentional scope 
predicted triconditional discrimination and explained variance in triconditional 
discrimination after accounting for simple associative learning, as indexed by the 
uniconditional discrimination. Narrow attentional scope was not related to a general 
deficit in associative learning; narrowing attentional scope did not relate to a 
reduction in uniconditional discrimination, rather there was evidence of enhanced 
uniconditional discrimination. This suggests that attentional scope relates to 
individual difference in configural associative learning, rather than simple efficiency 
of associative learning.   
EXPERIMENT 2 
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 While Experiment 1 used a measure of individual difference in attentional 
scope, ability to engage in configural associative learning can be influenced by 
training (for review, see Melchers et al., 2008; Soto et al., 2014). For instance 
experience solving a task with a configural solution (e.g., A+, B+, X-, AB-, AX+) can 
facilitate subsequent configural associative learning (Williams & Braker, 1999). 
Similarly, attentional scope can be trained, through practice attending to details or 
the global picture (Byrom & Murphy, 2014). In this experiment we sought to test 
whether the efficiency of configural associative learning could be enhanced or 
impaired with training.  
 Participants received training to narrow or broaden attentional scope prior to 
completing the uniconditional and biconditional discriminations. The triconditional 
was not included as both the biconditional and triconditional discrimination provide 
tests of configural discrimination. All participants completed both discrimination 
tasks, with task order counterbalanced.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants completed a Navon training task to train either a local or global 
attentional scope. The accuracy of performance on the training task provides an 
indication of how well participants engaged with the training and thus how effective 
the training was likely to be. The proportion of accurate responses ranged from .49 
to 1, with a median accuracy of .96, and mean accuracy of .94 (SD = .08). To ensure 
that all participants received an adequate level of training, 8 participants with an 
accuracy of less than .86 (1 SD below the mean) were excluded from subsequent 
analysis.   
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The remaining 70 participants (female, n = 56) were assigned to local (n =34) 
or global (n = 36) training. Participants were then pseudo-randomly assigned to one 
of two learning experience conditions; uniconditional task first or biconditional task 
first. As shown in Table 3, there was no evidence that these groups differed in Navon 
score (prior to training) or digit span, all F’s < 1.00, all p’s > .40. All participants were 
university students, with an average age of 22.13 years. 
Design and Materials 
A fully factorial design was employed with Navon training (local training, 
global training) and discrimination task order (uniconditional task first, biconditional 
task first) as the between subjects factor and discrimination task (uniconditional, 
biconditional) as a within subjects factors. The dependent variable was 
discrimination score, as described in Experiment 1. The stimuli for the discrimination 
task and Navon task were as described in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The general procedure was as described in Experiment 1 with the exception 
of the following changes. All participants completed the Navon task at the start of the 
experiment to measure attentional scope. Following the Navon task, participants 
completed attentional scope training to induce either narrow (local training) or broad 
(global training) attentional scope (see Byrom & Murphy, 2014). The attentional 
scope training task involved a minimal modification of the Navon task; rather than 
identifying large or small letters on alternate blocks, participants completing local 
training were only asked to identify small letters, while participants completing global 
training were only asked to identify large letters. Following attentional scope training 
participants completed the uniconditional and biconditional discrimination tasks.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As shown in Figure 5, Navon training influenced discrimination; local training 
interfered with the acquisition of the biconditional discrimination but enhanced 
acquisition of the uniconditional discrimination, while global training interfered with 
acquisition of the uniconditional discrimination and enhanced acquisition of the 
biconditional discrimination. These effects were seen in the second task that 
participants completed. For participants that completed the uniconditional 
discrimination first (see left panel of Figure 5), local training interfered with the 
acquisition of the biconditional discrimination. For participants that completed the 
biconditional discrimination first (see right panel of Figure 5), global training 
interfered with the acquisition of the uniconditional discrimination, relative to local 
training. These observations were supported by analysing the effect of Navon 
training on uniconditional and biconditional discrimination. 
Participants acquired both the uniconditional, F (1, 33) = 326.27, p < .000, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .91, and biconditional discrimination, F (1, 33) = 26.75, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .45, with 
higher ratings of outcome likelihood for stimuli paired with outcome, than stimuli 
paired with no outcome. Further, discrimination in the uniconditional task was 
significantly greater than discrimination in the biconditional task, F (1, 69) = 80.50, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .54.  
Navon training did not have a significant effect on the first task completed; 
individuals receiving local or global training did not differ significantly on either the 
uniconditional, F (1, 36) < 1, p = .389, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or biconditional discrimination, F (1, 
30) = 2.73, p = .109, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08. Significant effects of training however, were apparent 
on the second discrimination task completed. Participants with global Navon training 
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out performed those with local training on the biconditional discrimination, 𝑋 = 1.39 
(.62), F (1, 36) = 5.07, p = .031, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12, 95% CI (.00, .32). Participants with local 
Navon training out performed those with global training in the uniconditional 
discrimination, 𝑋 = 1.22 (.50), F (1, 30) = 5.95, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, 95% CI (.09, .27).  
Navon training influenced both uniconditional and biconditional discrimination 
in the second task completed, with local training enhancing uniconditional 
discrimination, relative to global training and interfering with biconditional 
discrimination relative to global training. This indicates that, at least short-term 
changes in configural learning, as distinct from efficiency of simple associative 
learning, may be trained, through a short and simple intervention.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Individual difference in configural learning was assessed in two experiments 
to test the hypotheses that attentional scope predicts the efficiency of configural 
learning, beyond a simple difference in associative learning and that ability to 
engage in configural, as opposed to simple, associative learning could be trained. 
These hypotheses were supported. In Experiment 1; broader attentional scope 
predicted stronger triconditional discrimination after accounting for simple associative 
learning. In Experiment 2 participants receiving local training showed stronger 
discrimination in the uniconditional task than participants receiving global training 
and participants receiving global training showed stronger discrimination in the 
biconditional task than participants receiving local training.  
 This pattern of results suggests that individuals differ in how they learn, with 
difference in configural learning not accounted for by differences in simple 
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associative learning. The experimental study of configural discriminations has 
provided important insights into theories of associative learning, here we provide 
evidence for these different mechanisms between individuals and within individuals. 
Enhanced efficiency of simple associative learning would predict absolute 
changes in the rate of learning, such that broader attentional scope should be 
simultaneously related to more efficient triconditional and more efficient 
uniconditional discrimination. Changes in the efficiency of associative learning can 
be captured by associative models of learning by changing the learning rate 
parameter (e.g., Pearce, 1987; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Modelling changes in the 
learning rate parameter predicts the same-direction of effect on the rate for learning 
for all three discriminations. That is, if we were to suggest that narrow attentional 
scope related to less efficient associative learning we should expect individuals with 
narrow attentional scope to acquire all three discriminations more slowly than 
individuals with broad attentional scope. We found little evidence for such a general 
difference in associative learning. Instead, narrowing attentional scope predicted a 
reduction in triconditional discrimination, without any reduction in the ability to solve 
the uniconditional discrimination. Indeed, there was some evidence that narrowing 
attentional scope enhanced uniconditional discrimination. 
 Enhanced configural learning would predict improved acquisition of 
biconditional and triconditional discriminations, without improved uniconditional 
discrimination. Solving the triconditional discrimination required participants to learn 
about the co-occurrence of stimuli. In contrast, learning about the co-occurrence of 
stimuli in the uniconditional discrimination would result in learning about irrelevant as 
well as relevant stimuli, retarding acquisition of the discrimination. This pattern of 
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discrimination related to broader attentional scope. Therefore, broader attentional 
scope seems to relate to stronger configural associative learning. 
 The current results are consistent with our assessments of configural learning 
in a negative patterning task; individuals with narrow attentional scope were impaired 
solving a negative patterning discrimination, compared to individuals with a broad 
attentional scope (Byrom & Murphy, 2014). Attentional scope did not influence ability 
to solve a simple discrimination. Further, configural learning could be trained; 
individuals trained to engage in a broad attentional scope were more efficient solving 
the negative patterning discrimination than those trained to engage in a narrow 
attentional scope (Byrom & Murphy, 2014). The results presented here extend these 
findings in a novel test of configural learning.  
Further, our results support previous observation of individual difference in 
configural learning. Haddon et al., (2014) compared acquisition of a biconditional and 
uniconditional discrimination and assessed individual difference in relation to 
schizotypy. Individuals with high scores on the introverted anhedonia subscale of the 
schizotypy questionnaire (OLIFE; Mason, Claridge and Jackson, 1995), showed 
disrupted acquisition of the biconditional discrimination, suggestive of a failure to 
configure stimuli. Interestingly, individuals with elevated schizotypy scores have also 
shown a bias towards local processing in the Navon task (e.g., Rawlings and 
Claridge, 1984).  
As found in tests of negative patterning, configural learning appears to be 
trainable. Both here and in our previous study (Byrom & Murphy, 2014), brief 
attentional scope training influenced configural associative learning, with training to 
broaden attentional scope enhancing ability to configure stimuli to solve non-linear 
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discriminations. However, while Navon training influenced both uniconditional and 
biconditional discrimination, the effect of training was not found with the first task 
completed immediately following the training. It is not clear why effects of training 
were only seen in the second task. 
This may be a consequence that the first discrimination task is somewhat 
easier than the second because the participants have no prior experience. Indeed, 
discrimination was significantly stronger on the first task completed, t (1, 77) = 2.35, 
p = .021. The effect of Navon training may emerge gradually. Alternatively, Navon 
training may interact with the discrimination experience more specifically. For 
instance, narrow attentional scope training may provide an advantage, enabling 
participants to switch back to focusing on a single relevant stimulus and ignore 
redundant stimuli, following experience that should encourage a focus on multiple 
co-occurring stimuli (i.e., a biconditional discrimination). A similar effect is plausible 
to occur in reverse for completing a biconditional discrimination after a uniconditional 
discrimination.  
Implications 
 Individual difference in configural associative learning is rarely tested, but may 
have important implications for understanding individual difference in the flexibility of 
learning in general, as well as clinical applications. Flexibility of human learning is an 
adaptive feature contributing to wellbeing (Beddington, Cooper, Field et al., 2008; 
Huppert, 2009). For instance, a behaviour that is appropriate in one circumstance 
may not be appropriate in a similar circumstance. To take an example, it may be 
appropriate to drink alcohol in the presence of work colleagues on a Friday night at a 
club, but it may not be appropriate to drink alcohol in the presence of colleagues on 
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a Monday morning in the office. Simple associations could facilitate learning that 
drinking alcohol is socially unacceptable and that not drinking alcohol is socially 
acceptable. Acquisition of a more flexible associative representation requires 
learning about the co-occurrence of stimuli and paired outcomes.  
 Narrow attentional scope predicted reduced ability to learn a triconditional 
discrimination, indicating reduced configural learning. Attentional scope may change 
with situations, but also reflects a more stable tendency related to high emotional 
arousal or stress (Cavenett & Nixon, 2006; Easterbrook, 1959; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005; Mather & Sutherland, 2011) and low mood (Basso, Schefft, Ris, & 
Dember, 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002). Reduced configural learning may thus 
provide a pathway between stress and low mood (associated with narrow attentional 
scope) and the reduced contextualisation of learning and memory observed in 
anxiety and depression (e.g., Grillon, 2002; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 2011). As individual 
difference in the ability to acquire configural associations was not explained simply in 
terms of difference in the efficiency of associative learning, future research needs to 
test configural learning to understand how and why individuals differ in their flexibility 
of learning. 
 Individual difference in configural associative learning described here is not 
easily captured in models of associative learning. However, previous studies have 
illustrated that the physical properties of the stimuli being learnt about can influence 
the extent to which configural representations are used, with unimodal and integral 
stimuli facilitating configural associative learning (for review, see Melchers et al., 
2008). Following these observations, models of associative learning have been 
adapted to accommodate variability between simple (or elemental) and configural 
associative learning (e.g., Honey et al., 2014; Kinder & Lachnit, 2003; Wagner, 
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2003). These adaptations focus on generalisation between representations; 
configural learning is enhanced by reduced generalisation between similar 
representations, such as AXR and AXS. Alternatively, we may think about individual 
difference in configural learning in terms of differences in sampling capacity, as 
shown in Table 4 (see also, Byrom & Murphy, 2014). Decreasing sampling capacity, 
with narrow attentional scope, reduces the probability of sampling a three stimulus 
configuration and increases the probability of sampling a single stimulus, reducing 
the efficiency of configural associative learning.   
 Individual difference in associative learning relates to a wide range of 
phenomena. Differences in associative learning are often conceptualised in terms of 
general efficiency of learning. However, general associative learning may be 
dissociated from configural associative learning. Individuals can differ in configural 
associative learning and these differences can be trained.   
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Table 1: Three conditional discrimination tasks, each using the same stimulus 
compounds, with each stimulus represented by a letter (e.g., A) and different paired 
outcomes, where + represents the presence of an outcome and – represents the 
absence.   
 Paired outcome 
Stimuli Compound Uniconditional Biconditional Triconditional 
AXR + + + 
BXR - - - 
AYR + - - 
BYR - + + 
AXS + + - 
BXS - - + 
AYS + - + 
BYS - + - 
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Table 2: Participant data for Experiment 1, split by discrimination order, showing 
means and standard error. U = Uniconditional, B = Biconditional, T = Triconditional. 
Such that U, B, T refers to participants who completed the Uniconditional task, the 
Biconditional task, then the Triconditional task. 
 U, B, T U, T, B B, U, T B, T, U T, U, B T, B, U 
N 13 15 13 16 16 8 
Navon First 2 4 5 5 4 1 
Attentional scope 
2.86 
(2.51) 
3.13 
(1.26) 
-1.35 
(2.28) 
2.23 
(2.46) 
-2.34 
(2.84)  
1.91 
(3.61) 
Digit Span 
7.08 
(.61) 
6.60 
(.70) 
7.54 
(.18) 
6.69 
(.66) 
7.00 
(.53) 
5.75 
(1.26) 
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Table 3: Participant data for Experiment 2, split by Navon training group and 
experience, showing means and standard error.  
 
Uni-Bi: 
Local 
Uni-Bi: 
Global 
Bi-Uni: 
Local 
Bi-Uni: 
Global 
F test* 
Attentional 
scope 
-1.26 
(1.86) 
-1.87 
(2.45) 
-.20 (2.13) 2.55 (1.72) F < 1, p = .40 
Digit Span 7.72 (.11) 7.80 (.11) 7.82 (.12) 7.72 (.11) F < 1, p = .90 
*df = 3, 65 
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Table 4: the probability of sampling three dimensions, two dimensions or one 
dimension from a three dimensional stimulus, as the sampling capacity of a limited 
capacity buffer increases. These calculations assume each stimulus to be 
represented by 10 features.    
Sampling Capacity of 
Buffer 
(number of features) 
Probability of sampling a configuration of… 
Three 
dimensions 
(e.g., AXR) 
Two 
dimensions 
(e.g., AX) 
One 
dimension 
(e.g., A) 
1 0 0 1 
2 0 .69 .30 
3 .25 .66 .09 
4 .49 .48 .03 
5 .67 .32 .01 
6 .81 .19 0 
7 .89 .11 0 
8 .94 .06 0 
9 .96 .04 0 
10 .98 .02 0 
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Figure 1: The six different black foreground shapes used to create stimuli. The black 
shapes were one dimension of the stimuli, presented on a coloured background 
(dimension two) made from angled lines (dimension 3). Within each stimulus set, two 
different black shapes were used, allowing this dimension to vary between two 
points.  
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Figure 2: Average discrimination difference scores for Experiment 1, showing local 
and global participant groups for each of the three tasks across the first and second 
half of training. Error bars show standard error. 
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Figure 3: Ratings of outcome likelihood, for all participants, for stimuli paired with a 
positive outcome (+) and negative outcome (-) for Experiment 1, for uniconditional 
(U), biconditional (B) and triconditional (T) discriminations. Error bars show standard 
error. 
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Figure 4: Average discrimination difference scores for Experiment 2, showing local 
and global training groups for uniconditional and biconditional tasks split by the 
whether this was the first or second task completed. Participants labelled Uni – Bi, 
completed the uniconditional discrimination prior to the biconditional discrimination. 
Participants labelled Bi – Uni completed the biconditional discrimination prior to the 
uniconditional discrimination. Error bars show standard error. 
 
 
 
 
